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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
GEORGE WILLIAM BURTON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 17252 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was found guilty by a jury of a violation 
of Section 76-6-404, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended 
(Theft, a felony of the second degree) and the subsequent 
Judgment was entered August 7, 1980. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried before a jury on July 14, 1980, 
the Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, Judge, Third Judicial 
District Court, presiding. 
The jury found him guilty of a violation of Section 
-6-6-~04, Utah Code Annotated (1953), as amended, a felony of 
t~ie second degree. The verdict was entered July 14, 1980. 
:ujg~ent was entered August 7, 1980 and appellant was 
~entenced to an indeterminate term in the Utah State Prison of 
: ~o 15 ·;ears. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks aff irmance of the judgment and 
sentence of the court below. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant was convicted of two counts of theft. 
Count I was for Theft of a Vehicle; Count II for Theft of 
Property valued at more than $1,000. 
On the afternoon of April 11, 1980, appellant 
apparently picked up an individual known as "Crazy Fish" while 
driving down State Street in Salt Lake City (T. 70). The next 
few hours fo~~a appellant and "Crazy Fish" drinking beer and 
smoking mari:uana (T. 71, 76). Appellant claimed he 
personally imbibed "[m)aybe eighteen to twenty" cans of beer 
in "[f) ive or six hours" (T. 71). 
In the late afternoon appellant and his companion 
went to appellant's mother's house at 256 North 800 West in 
Salt Lake (T. 60, 72). Appellant left "Crazy Fish" in his car 
while he went inside to get something to eat (T. 72). 
A few minutes later appellant's foster sister 
entered the home and indicated someone was driving off in 
appellant's car (T. 60, 72). Appellant hastily left on foot 
in p~rsuit of the indivi5ual driving his car. 
-2-
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At approximately 8:00 p.m. (T. 15) in the area of 
600 West and 200 South in Salt Lake, appellant "discovered a 
car with the keys in it" (T. 73), which he "took off with" 
allegedly to locate his car (T. 73). 
The vehicle he "took off with" belonged to Cliff 
Bowden, who, with his wife, was visiting Elver Langdon and his 
;;i:!:e ( T. 6). Bowden had been inside for "approximately ten 
T,inutes" (T. 10) when he heard his car start up, die, and 
;r,:i:ne:1tarily start again ( T. 10). He knew it was his car as he 
haJ removed the muffler and its exhaust was quite noisy (T. 
l 0 I . 
Bowden and his friend Langdon ran out of the house 
to see his vehicle spinning its tires "going backward into the 
str:eet" (T. 11). Bowden testified he "got right up . • to 
the right front fender . (T. 12) where he saw an 
inJividual he identified as appellant operating the vehicle. 
There were no other persons in the vehicle (T. 13). Bowden 
testified he had to jump out of the way "to keep from getting 
i".it with the vehicle as . [appellant] went forward" 
'-·:ith the "tires squealing" (T. 13, 14). Bowden returned to 
ris friend's house and reported the theft to the police (T. 
l 4 I . 
The car was recovered about an hour later by the 
~-Jlice (T. 15). \'/hen Bowden claimed it he noticed that much 
-3-
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of the personal property he had in it was missing (T. 16). He 
gave a detailed list of the missing propety in Court (T. 
18-32). 
As noted above, appellant claimed the car had keys 
in it when he took it (T. 73). This conflicts with the 
accounts of Bowden and the arresting officer, Charles Oliver. 
Bowden testified the only key was "[i]n my pocket" when he 
went to retrieve his car from the location where police 
officers had stopped appellant (T. 33, 47). 
The arresting officer testified he found no car 
keys or property when he placed appellant under arrest (T. 
49-52). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY ON THE SUBJECT OF VOLUNTARY 
INTOXICATION. 
Appellant does not, in his pleadings, assert the 
defense of voluntary intoxication; however, statements made ~ 
h irr. in his testimony can be cons trued as an assert ion of that 
defense at trial. It therefore became necessary to instruct 
the jury on voluntary intoxication to avoid confusion and 
err::ir. 
-4-
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The facts surrounding appellant's consuming alcohol and 
smoking marijuana on the afternoon of the admitted theft were 
developed by his own counsel on direct examination. The 
prosecutor sought to clarify the extent of impairment to 
appellant's reasoning and functioning abilities on cross-
examina t ion. 
Appellant testified he consumed "eighteen to 
twenty" cans of beer (T. 71) and "[a] few ..• joints 
[cigarettes] or pipe[s]" of marijuana in "six or seven hours 
easily" (T. 76). When asked by his attorney to "describe ..• 
how your feeling was at the time with respect to the alcohol 
hou had?" (T. 75), appellant indicated he was "[m]ad" and 
"definitely" intoxicated, having "had a lot to drink" ~. 75, 
82). He indicated he finished the last can of beer twenty to 
thirty minutes before he took Bowden's car (T. 76). 
On cross examination, the county attorney asked 
about the effect of the alcohol and marijuana on appellant on 
the day in question. Appellant replied that it had "[t]oo 
~0ch effect," and that he had some difficulty standing (T. 
77), out that he understood what was occurring (T. 78). 
The following testimony by appellant seems to 
assert some sort of excuse or defense related to his ingestion 
J: alcohol and marijuana. 
-5-
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Q: You are not claiming that the alcohol or drugs had 
affected you to the point you did not understand what you we~ 
doing? 
A: I think if I were sober--
Q: That is not the question. There are a lot of things 
people do when they are sober they wouldn't do when they are 
not accountable for them. Are you claiming that you didn't 
understand when you took the car? 
A: Really I don't think I did. 
Q: You don't think you knew what you were doing? 
A: Yes. I really don't think I knew what I was doing (T. 
79). 
When questioned as to the circumstances surrounding 
his taking Bowden's car, appellant was asked concerning 
discrepancies in the facts as he remembered them and as others 
remembered them. Appellant attributed his lack of knowledge 
to the fact of his intoxication when the events occurred (T. 
81) or to the fact that he just could not remember (T. 84). 1 
l(a) Bowden testified he and Langdon ran out of the house 
and that he "got right up" next to the fender of the 
car--close enough to identify appellant as the driver--and 
that appellant took off fast ( T. 12-14). Appellant testified 
he did not remember seeing any people when he took the car and 
he was so intoxicated he did not know if he took off fast Qr 
not (T. 81). 
(b)Bowden testified the only key to the car was in his 
possession (T. 33, 34). Appellant testified the key was in 
the car ( T. 8 0 ) • 
(c) Officer Oliver testified as to appellant's speed anj 
evasive maneuvers (T. 44-46). l\ppellant test":'ied r,e s 
right away when he saw the police officer (T. 84, 85). 
-E-
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Appellant's testimony on cross examination 
concerning his condition relative to the substances he had 
consumed was full of equivocal, vague answers typified by the 
words "I don't know" (T. 77-82). He did say he was probably 
so intoxicated he did not understand what was being said to 
~ i:n ( T. 8 2) • 
Appellant testified extensively concerning the kind 
and a~ount of intoxicants he consumed on the day of the theft, 
the period of time during which the intoxicants were consumed, 
and the proximity of that time to the time when he committed 
the: tneft. However, appellant's testimony concerning the 
extent to which the intoxicants he had consumed on the day of 
t~e crime had affected his powers of perception and 
understanding was confused and unclear. 
Appellant requested and received an instruction 
(t~e instruction given referred to the "defendant or a 
,;itness" (CT 60)) concerning the prior convictions of 
witnesses (which in this case included appellant) and the 
weight to be given by the jury to those prior convictions in 
their consideration of the instant case (the instruction given 
-e:ec:-ed to the "defendant or a ·witness" (C'I' 60)). Respondent 
a"~ees that even in a case like the one at bar in which the 
2 ':3t10 does :-iot assert that the <'lefendant is a habitual 
:~:~~-al or that there is a common scheme or plan, it mig~t 
-,-
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be prejudicial to have evidence of appellant's prior 
convictions before the jury with no limiting instruction froo 
the court to indicate how the jury must consider those 
convictions in their deliberations. Similarly, respondent 
contends it is unfair to have extensive testimony concerning 
appellant's voluntary intoxication at the time he committed 
the crime before the jury with no instruction concerning the 
law applicable to voluntary intoxication. Respondent asserts 
it was not unreasonable to give an instruction relative to the 
defense of voluntary intoxication. Where testimony before the 
jury could raise an inference that such defense was being 
asserted by appellant, or in the very least could create doubt 
in the minds of some jurors as to how they should consider 
appellant's testimony relative to his intoxication, an 
instruction as was given in this case was warranted and 
appropriate. 
Appellant seems to want the benefit of having 
extensive testimony as to his inebriated, sorrowful condition 
on record before the jury without having that jury fully 
advised as to the manner in which they were to consider such 
evidence. To allow such testimony without an instruction to 
clarify it and without giving the jury a standard to assess 
its importance in this case would be error. The instruction 
in ·roluntary intoxication of which appellant now complains has 
avoided error. 
-8-
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State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981), cited by 
appellant, is inapposite to the issues in this case. In 
~· the trial court erred in that it neglected to indicate 
the "effect of voluntary intoxication" as it related to both 
general and specific intent crimes, nor did "the court relate 
the legal effect of intoxication to the facts. • " Id. at 
80. 
In the instant case, the crime of Theft and the 
included offense of Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle are both 
specific intent crimes (CT 68-70). The court in this case 
properly applied the legal effect of voluntary intoxication to 
the charges against appellant (CT 67). 
In this case, the wording of the first sentence of 
instruction 16B (involuntary intoxication) (CT 67) was taken 
almost verbatim from the statutory language cited approvingly 
by this court. 76-2-306 Utah Code Annotated (1953), as 
amended. Additions were made to relate the instruction to the 
facts of this case. Appellant does not assert that the 
statements in the instruction are inaccurate statements of 
Utah law, but only that they are inappropriate to the case at 
bar. 
The general rule applicable to appellant's 
contention that "the instruction on voluntary intoxication 
presented a theory of the case advanced by neither the 
-9-
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appellant nor the state" (Appellant's Brief, 8) can be found 
in State v. Odell, 227 P.2d 710 (Wash. 1951). Quoting Corp'Js 
Juris Secundum, the court said: 
Id. at 720. 
* * * An instruction which correctly 
states the law and is based on competent 
evidence in the case is not erroneous 
even though it is not in consonance with 
the theories of either party. 23 C.J.S., 
Criminal Law, § 1312, 912. 
* * * It is not, of course, improper for 
the court to instruct the jury that 
certain matters do not constitute a 
defense, when such is the case; * * * 23 
C.J.S., Criminal Law, § 1199, 752. 
There is, then, no requirement that all the 
instructions given a jury in a criminal case mesh with some 
theory explicitly advanced by either side as long as the 
instruction is based on "competent evidence." Id. Here the 
evidence of appellant's intoxication was derived largely froo 
his own testimony. In State v. Potter, supra, this court 
indicated the trial court has a "duty to instruct the jury on 
the law applicable to the facts of the case." Id. at 78 
(Emphasis added). 
The state has a right to receive an instruction on 
voluntary intoxication in cases like the one at bar. 
-10-
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In People v. Rogers, 157 N.C. 2d 28 (Ill. 1959), in 
~~ich a larceny conviction was upheld by the Illinois Supreme 
Court, the defendant alleged it was error for the trial court 
to give an instruction similar to that given, in the instant 
case. 
Id. at 32. 
Defendant complains about numerous 
instructions given by the court at the 
request of the State and complains of the 
court's refusal to give certain 
instructions tendered by him. 
The other People's instruction instructed 
the jury that voluntary drunkenness was 
no defense to the crime of larceny. 
Defendant argues that he never intended 
to use his drunkenness as a defense and 
therefore the State had no right to an 
instruction on the subject. We find that 
a considerable portion of defendant's 
testimony at the trial was taken up with 
evidence of his drinking and intoxication 
and two other witnesses who testified for 
him limited their testimony to that fact. 
With this evidence of intoxication in the 
record, the State was entitled to give an 
instruction on its theory of the case. 
This same reasoning is found in State v. Lincoln, 
~82 s.w. 2d 424 (Mo. 1972), in which the Missouri Supreme 
:c~rt upheld defendant's conviction for burglary and stealing 
~~ile rejecting his assertions that the trial court committed 
-11-
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error in giving an instruction on voluntary intoxication when 
defendant had not asserted that as a defense. 
The record shows that the matter of 
defendant's asserted intoxication was 
referred to only in interrogation on 
behalf of defendant. He testified 
himself at some length on the subject .... 
There were numerous instances in which 
the subject of defendant's intoxication 
was referred to. Under these 
circumstances, the giving of the 
instruction was proper. 
Id. at 426 (Citation omitted) [Accord: State v. Zerban, 412 
s.w. 2d 397 (~o. 1967)]. 
The origin of this rule in Missouri is found in 
State v. Sawyer, 365 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1963) where the Supreme 
Court upheld a conviction of first degree robbery. 
In Instruction No. 3 the court 
instructed that voluntary intoxication is 
nc excuse for the commission of crime. 
Defendant assigns error, saying 
intoxication was not raised by him as an 
excuse or reason for the acts that 
allegedly took place. The record is 
replete with testimony concerning heavy 
drinking by and the intoxication of both 
defendant and Boyer. Defendant testified 
he was sick from drinking and a little 
intoxicated at the time of the robbery. 
It is the accepteo rule that 
voluntary intoxication is not an excuse 
for the commission of crime.... Our Rule 
26.02 states "the court, whether or not 
it shall have been req~ested so to do by 
either party, must instruct the jury in 
writing upon all questions of law 
-12-
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necessary for their guidance in returning 
their verdict * *." Assuming that the 
instruction is outside the scope of the 
mandatory instructions contemplated in 
Rule 26.02 . . this does not mean that 
the trial court may not or should not 
give it. Even though defendant takes the 
position in his motion for new trial that 
he was not relying on drunkenness as an 
excuse for his alleged acts, his 
testimony and that of others placed that 
subject before the jury. It was in the 
interest of justice to give the jury for 
their guidance in returning their verdict 
the applicable law on this subject before 
them under the evidence, and the trial 
court did not err in so doing. 
re. at 492 (Citations omitted). 
In People v. Conlev, 243 P.2d 874 (Cal. 1952), the 
defendants' conviction for assault was upheld by the 
California Court of Appeal. Defendant contended the trial 
court had erred in giving various instructions to the jury. 
The third was the usual instruction to 
the effect that no act is less criminal 
because it was committed by a person 
while in a state of voluntary 
intoxication. It is argued that these 
instructions were improper since no such 
defenses were raised. The appellant 
relies on People v. Silver, 16 Cal. 2d 
714, 108 P.2d 4, where it was held that 
in a close case a misleading instruction 
on an issue not raised is prejudicial 
where it may have confused the jury on a 
matter vital to the defense. No such 
situation here appears. These matters 
were not vital to the defense and there 
is nothing to indicate that the jury was 
confused or misled. 
In Conlev, the ~efendant ~ad testified he was 
-13-
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not drunk, but "there was evidence to support a contrary 
inference, and the instruction on intoxication was neither 
erroneous nor harmful." Id. 
The rule, as stated by the California Supreme court 
in Peoole v. Silver, 108 P.2d 4 (Cal. 1940), cited in~, 
supra, is: 
Where errors in instructions occur, 
the question always arises as to whether 
or not they are prejudicial. Here it may 
be said that where the proof of a 
defendant's guilt is clear, and no 
extenuating circumstances appear, such 
errors may not be prejudicial. But where 
a case, is what may be termed a 
"close" case, and where the erroneous 
instructions concern matters vital to the 
defense of the defendant, and may have 
resulted in a miscarriage of justice, we 
are of the opinion that such errors must 
be regarded as prejudicial and should 
result in a new trial for the defendant. 
Silver, supra, at 9. 
In the instant case, respondent submits there was 
no error in giving the instruction on voluntary intoxication. 
The instruction itself was a correct statement of the law. 
The matter of appellant's intoxication was not "vital" (_!.i.) 
to r.is defense. The record discloses the jury had an adequate 
found3tion on which to base their inferences and conclusions 
as they evaluated the testimony and evidence presented by all 
the witnesses, including appellant. 
-14-
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As appellant indicates (Appellant's Brief at 4), 
the jury was fully aware it could find him guilty or not 
guilty of Theft of a Vehicle or the lesser included offense of 
Unlawful Taking of a Vehicle (CT 63, 64, 81). Finally, this 
was not a "close" case in the meaning of Silver, supra. 
The cases do not disclose any essential distinction 
between the terms "excuse" and "defense" as used in the jury 
instructions in this case, and respondent submits there is no 
distinction uorth noting. 
Respondent submits that where evidence of a 
defendant's intoxication at the time he committed the crime 
co~es before the jury for their consideration and this 
evidence was derived largely from defendant's testimony, the 
state is entitled to an instruction on that subject. 
POINT II 
AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY ON THE 
"REASON AB LE ALTERtlATIVE HY POTH ES IS" 
THEORY WAS NOT REQUIRED AND WOULD HAVE 
BEEN SUPERFLUOUS AS A CORRECT INSTRUCTION 
ON REASONABLE DOUBT HAD ALREADY BEEN 
GIVEN. 
Appellant contends that (1) it was error to deny 
his request for an instruction on the reasonable alternative 
~1~0JCJthesis, claiming that the evidence supporting Count II of 
t~e information (relating to the theft of property inside the 
-15-
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stolen vehicle) was "entirely . . circumstantial" 
(Appellant's Brief at 9) and subject to alternative 
conclusions. 2 2) Appellant further contends that there is 
danger that in the absence of such an instruction the jury 
would not understand that if there were another explanation 
for defendant's conduct giving rise to a reasonable doubt as 
to his guilt, he should be acquitted. ( 3) Appellant further 
contends that failure to give the requested instruction coulc 
result in confusion as to the State's burden of proof. 
Appellant's first point is without merit. Bowden' s testimony 
was direct evidence from which the jury could draw inferences 
as it recreated the facts, reconciled conflicts in a 
reasonable manner, and determined the weight to be given the 
evidence before it. 
2•A distinction is drawn between direct evidence and 
circumstantial evidence. Evidence is direct when the witness 
testifies as to the facts in dispute on the basis of his own 
knowledge of them. Circumstantial evidence assumes a witness 
who has no knowledge of the facts in dispute, but knows of 
other facts and circumstances which, when offered in evidence, 
may permit the fact finder to infer that the facts in dispurt 
existed or did not exist. The inference will be drawn if, in 
accordance with the common experience of mankind, a reasonab~ 
relationship may be perceived between the known facts and 
circumstances and the facts sought to be proved. In terms of 
implementation, however, there is no distinction between 
direct evidence and circumstantial evidence •.~harton' 0 
C:-i:-.inc.l Evidence 4 (13th Ed. 1972). 
-16-
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Assuming, arguendo, that all the evidence on which 
a?pellant's conviction was based was circumstantial, 
respondent suggests there is no reason why it should be 
accorded less weight than so-called direct evidence. 
A?pellant suggests that because evidence is circumstantial, it 
is somehow less probative than direct evidence and therefore 
s~spect, requiring a reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction. 
In this regard, Justice Wilkins had this to say in 
his concurring opinion in State v. John, 586 P.2d 410 (Utah 
19781. 
I do not agree with the majority 
opinion's comment that ". despite 
whatever weaknesses circumstantial 
evidence may have, it is recognized as a 
valid method of ascertaining the truth" 
because it implies that generally this 
class of evidence is inherently less 
reliable than direct evidence. I do 
however otherwise concur in the opinion. 
The weight to be given to direct 
evidence is not--as a matter of 
law--necessarily greater than that given 
to circumstantial evidence. I believe an 
accurate statement of the law appears in 
30 Am.Jur. 2d, Evidence, Sec. 1126, where 
it states: 
Many decisions are to the 
effect that circumstantial evidence in a 
-17-
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Id. at 413. 
criminal case may be fully as satisfying 
as positive testimony and will sometimes 
outweigh it. In cases where the facts or 
circumstances which are proved are not 
only consistent with the guilt of the 
defendant, but also inconsistent with his 
innocence, such evidence, in its weight 
and probative force, may surpass direct 
evidence in its effect upon the jury .•. 
Circumstantial evidence deserves a like 
consideration as to the sworn statements 
of a witness and may disprove the 
testimony of living witnesses, and there 
is nothing in the nature of 
circumstantial evidence that renders it 
less reliable than other classes of 
evidence (Citations omitted). 
In this case the court instructed the jury that: 
Where • [a] . conflict cannot be 
reconciled, you are the final judges and 
must determine from the evidence what the 
facts are. [Y]ou should carefully 
and conscientiously consider and compare 
all of the testimony, and all of the 
facts and circumstances, which have a 
bearing on any issue, and determine 
therefrom what the facts are. You are 
not bound to believe all that the 
witnesses have testified to or any 
witness or class of witnesses unless such 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in 
view of all of the facts and 
circumstances in evidence. [I]f you 
believe a witness has wilfully testified 
falsely as to any material fact in this 
case, you may disregard the whole of the 
testimony of such witness, or you may 
give it such weight as you think it is 
entitled to. 
(Inst~uc~ion #8, CT 57). 
-18-
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The two versions the jury had before it regarding 
the missing property were: (1) Mr. Bowden's testimony as to 
what property was in the car when he and his wife entered the 
Langdon residence (T. 16-32); and (2) appellant's assertion 
that he saw no property in the car when he took it (T. 74). 
The fact that the vehicle sat for about 10 minutes before 
a;ipellant drove it away and the fact that appellant claimed he 
left the vehicle unattended for a similar period were also 
known to the jury ( T. 35, 74). 
The jury could give whatever weight it wanted to 
the inference someone other than appellant took the property 
inside the car, or that the property never existed in the 
: irs t place. Based on the apparent inconsistencies in 
a;ipellant's testimony when factual assertions made by him are 
compared with the assertions of other witnesses, it is 
reasonable that the jury chose not to give as much weight to 
a~pellant's version of these facts as it gave to the versions 
given by other witnesses (See note 1, p. 6, supra). It was 
the jury's prerogative to reach its conclusions based upon the 
e~idence adduced at trial, and to decide which of the 
"'itdesses to believe or disbelieve. 
Appellant's second and third points can be disposed 
Appellant has not shown why the alternative 
~~00thesis instruction was required. There has been no 
-l9-
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authority cited which supports the contention that the 
omission of the alternative hypothesis was improper. 
The standard in Utah as to the giving of such an 
instruction was stated in State v. Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 
1977); and State v. Garcia, 355 P.2d 57 (Utah 1960): 
[W]here the only proof of material fact 
or one which is a necessary element of 
defendant's guilt consists of 
circumstantial evidence, such 
circumstances must reasonably preclude 
every reasonable hypothesis of 
defendant's innocence . 
This rule is applicable only where the 
Jroof of a ~aterial issue is based solely 
~~ circumstantial evidence 
355 P.2d at 59, 60 (emphasis added). The principle was cited 
and reaffirmed in State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246, 247 (Utah 
1970); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 1976); State v. 
Durr.as, 554 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1976); and State v. Bender, 581 
P.2d 1019 (Utah 1978). 
As was pointed out above, the proof in this case 
was not solely circumstantial as it related to the theft of 
Mr. Bowden's property. 
In State v. Hopkins, 359 P.2d 485 (Utah 1961), a 
similar situation to the one presented before this Court 
existed in that the defendant's version was totally different 
fro~ t~at of the prosecution's, especially as to the issue 
-20-
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of intent. There, the Court refused to give a reasonable 
hypothesis instruction, saying that the jury must decide which 
version of the evidence to believe: 
Id. at 487. 
The difficulty with defendant's 
position is that the rule he relies on is 
not applicable where, as here, there is 
dispute in the evidence and one version 
thereof does not support his thesis. He 
errs in assuming that the jury was 
obliged to believe his story as to what 
happened 
This Court recently affirmed the rule that an 
alternative hypothesis instruction is superfluous. State v. 
Eagle, 611P.2d1211 (Utah 1981). This rule has been gaining 
~ornentum in other jurisdictions as well as in the federal 
courts. Basically, the analysis is as follows: 
"[S]ubstantial evidence" is necessary to 
warrant submission of a case to the jury. 
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, of 
course, is a jury question. . The 
substantial evidence required to warrant 
a conviction may be either circumstantial 
or direct. . The probative value of 
evidence is not reduced simply because it 
is circumstantial. . The probative 
value of direct and circumstantial 
evidence is essentially sirr,ilar, and 
there is no distinction as to weight 
assigned to eac'"i. .r.. conviction may be 
sustained on circumstantial evidence 
alone. . The pr:osecution is no longer 
reaui red, in a case based wholly upon 
circumstantial evidence, to negate every 
conceivable hypot~esis of innocence .... 
-~l-
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State v. Blevins, 623 P.2d 853, 856 (Ariz. App. 1981) 
(Citations omitted). 
This Court said in State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 
(Utah 1981): 
In regard to the propriety of the 
so-called "reasonable alternative 
hypothesis" jury instruction, any 
controversy over its use constitutes 
nothing more than a tempest in a teapot. 
The prosecution's burden of proof in any 
criminal case, whether the evidence be 
direct or circumstantial, or a 
combination of both, is that of beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The use of the 
reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction is merely one way of 
expressing that necessary burden of proof 
an] there is no apparent reason to 
mandate that one, and only one, 
particular instruction be used by trial 
judges in conveying to the jury the 
meaning of that elusive phrase, "proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt." It may well 
be that one of our astute jurists may 
make even a substantial improvement of 
the reasonable alternative hypothesis 
instruction, if in fact one has not 
already done so. In any event, the 
"reasonable doubt" instruction given in 
the instant case clearly and 
appropriately informed the jury of the 
legal standard to be applied. 
Id. at 1213 (See also: State v. Stacks, 627 P.2d 88, 92 (Utar 
1981); State v. Lamb, 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980); State v. King, 
604 P.2d 923 (Utah 1979); State v. Peoples, 605 P.2d 135, i41 
(!\a:-is. 1980); State v. Seelen, 485 P.2d 826, 828-9 (Ariz. 
19 7 l) • 
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The test, then, is whether the "reasonable doubt" 
instruction given in a case "clearly and appropriately 
inform[s] the jury of the legal standard to be applied." 
Eagle, supra, at 1213. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that the.evidence was all 
circumstantial, an instruction on reasonable alternative 
hypothesis need not be given. In Holland v. United States, 
348 U.S. 121, reh. denied 348 u.s. 932 (1954),3 the 
petitioners assailed the refusal of the trial judge to 
instruct that where the Government's evidence is 
circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every reasonable 
hypothesis other than guilt. The Supreme Court admitted that 
there was some case law supporting that type of instruction, 
but then stated: 
~ 2'2 e 
''. ~:. r. 
. the better rule is that where 
the jury is properly instructed on the 
standards for reasonable doubt, such an 
additional instruction on circumstantial 
evidence is confusing and incorrect 
[citations omitted]. 
Circumstantial evidence in this 
respect is intrinsically no different 
from testimonial evidence. Admittedly, 
circumstantial evidence may in some cases 
point to a 11holly incorrect result. Yet 
this is equally true of testimonial 
evidence. In both instances, a jury is 
asked to weight the chances that the 
evidence correctly points to guilt 
lsc: United S~ates v. Battista, 646 F.2d 237, 246 
i r- • 1 9 s 1 ) ; 'Jn it e d scat es \. . Patterson , 6 4 4 F . 2 d 8 9 0 , 8 9 4 
ir. 1981); ~·nited States\'. Di:'.:lskin, 64-1 "'.2d ·118, 420 
ir. 1981). 
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against the possibility of inaccuracy or 
a.mbiguous inference. In both, the jury 
must use its experience with people and 
events in weighing the probabilities. If 
the jury is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt, we can require no more. 
suora, at 139-140. 
The law is primarily concerned that an accused 
shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Utah Code Annotated, § 76-1-501 (1953), as 
amended. There is no need to risk confusing the jury with 
instructions to the effect that if the evidence is 
circumstantial it must exclude every reasonable hypothesis 
other tha~ guilt. If a jury, upon weighing all evidence 
whether circumstantial or direct, is convinced of a 
defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt the law is 
satisfied. 
An instruction on reasonable doubt provides an 
understandable criterion for decision making; an instruction 
on reasonable alternative hypothesis is unnecessary and may 
confuse the jury. In the instant case, the jury was properly 
instructed on reasonable doubt. See Instruction #7 (CT 56). 
T~e trial judge evidently concluded a reasonable alternative 
hypothesis instruction was superfluous. Such a determination 
was within his discretion and was properly exercised. 
The jury in ttis case, consistent with their 
careful instruction on reasonable doubt, logicslly excluded 
all reasonable alternative hypothesis by their guilty verdict. 
-24-
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--
Appellant has not only failed to show that his requested 
instruction is required but has also failed to show that if it 
w0uld have been given in this case, it would have made some 
difference. 
Even if the trial court had erred in refusing to 
give the requested instruction, that error would have been 
harmless. Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 30; Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-35-30 (1980). The instructions, when read as a 
whole, require the jury to consider the testimony of appellant 
in reaching its verdict (See Instruction 23, CT 74). 
Instructions Numbers 7 and 8 (CT 56, 67) instructed 
the Jury to weigh and consider all of the evidence and 
circumstances shown by the evidence in arriving at a verdict. 
Instruction Number 10 (CT 59) informed the jury that the 
defendant is a competent witness and that his testimony should 
be weighed the same as that of any other witness. Instruction 
Number 5 (CT 54) required the jury to impartially consider and 
compare all of the evidence. Instruction Number 3 (CT 53) 
Lequired the jury to find ap~ellant not guilty so long as a 
reascnable doubt exists. 
l < 9 O ( :_} t ah 19 7 7 ) . 
See State v. 'laestas, 564 P. 2d 1386, 
The weight of both state and federal authority is 
to ~ne effect that a complete instruction on reasonable doubt 
l~ S'cfci::~ent to ad·:ise a jury of '.:l;e burdens that must be 
- :::'. s-
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borne by each party and the manner in which it is to evaluate 
and weigh the evidEnce presented in a criminal case. Such an 
instruction was given in this case. 
Discussing the standard of review where 
insufficiency of evidence is alleged this Court said: 
It is the exclusive function of the 
jury to weigh the evidence and to 
determine the credibility of the 
witnesses, and it is not within the 
prerogative of this Court to substitute 
its judgment for that of the factfinder. 
This Court should only interfere when the 
evidence is so lacking and insubstantial 
that reasonable men could not possibly 
have reached a verdict beyond a 
rEasonable doubt (footnote omitted). 
State v. Lamrr., 606 P.2d 229 (Utah 1980) at 231. See also: 
State v. Logan, 563 P.2d 811 (Utah 1977); State v. Asay, 631 
P.2d 861 (Utah 1981); State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216 (Utah 
1976); State v. Granato, 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980); State v. 
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977); State v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 
(Utah 1977); and State v. Erickson, 568 P.2d 750 (Utah 1977). 
Moreover, "the evidence is to be viewed in the light most 
favorable to the jury's verdict." State v. Gorlick, 605 ?.2,j 
761 (Utah 1979). 
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-CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing authorities and arguments, 
respondent respectfully submits that the conviction and 
sentence of the appellant were proper and schould be affirmed 
by this Court. 
0./-;!:::-
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